From the +2.6% trough in August 2025 to +6.0% in just 8 months. A sharp 1.1pp beat over the +4.9% consensus, with MoM +1.4% the hottest wholesale-price reading since January 2023. This number is precisely the first full pass-through of the broad tariffs that took effect on April 2. Here we lay out the charts, tables, five macro implications, scenarios, and the impact on the Korean market.
Below is the 10-month time series of Final Demand PPI (headline) as released by the US BLS. The October 2025 print is shown as blank because the release was delayed/omitted due to the government shutdown (Oct–Nov 2025), and for some months the YoY figure carries source-specific revisions, so we show the initial-release reading.
| Month | YoY % | MoM % | Release date | Key comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025.7 | +3.3 | +0.7 | 2025.8.14 | Wholesale prices beat market expectations sharply. July MoM later revised from +0.9 to +0.7 |
| 2025.8 | +2.6 | -0.1 | 2025.9.10 | YoY slowed. The coolest of the 10 months. The starting point of +3.4pp of acceleration over the next 8 months |
| 2025.9 | ~+2.7* | +0.3 | 2025.10.16 | MoM in line with consensus. YoY cited as +2.7% by some sources |
| 2025.10 | n/a | n/a | — | BLS release delayed/omitted due to the government shutdown (Oct–Nov 2025) |
| 2025.11 | +3.0 | +0.2 | 2026.1.14 | First regular release after the shutdown. Goods +0.9, Services 0.0. YoY enters the 3% range |
| 2025.12 | ~+3.1* | +0.4 (est.) | 2026.1.30 | Nonferrous metals +4.5%, Diesel -14.6%. Full-year 2025 PPI confirmed at +3.0% (slowing from +3.5% in 2024) |
| 2026.1 | ~+3.5* | +0.6 | 2026.2.27 | First month with shutdown effects normalized. MoM accelerates |
| 2026.2 | ~+3.7* | +0.5 | 2026.3 | Just before tariffs took effect on April 2. Baseline inflation was already accelerating |
| 2026.3 | +4.0 | +0.5 | 2026.4.14 | 3-year high (the prior +4.7% was Feb 2023). Goods +1.6, Services 0.0. Gasoline +15.7. Core MoM +0.1, cool. The last clean data point before tariffs took effect |
| 2026.4 | +6.0 | +1.4 | 2026.5.13 | Shock result (a sharp beat over consensus +4.9% / +0.5% on both). Goods +2.0, Services +1.2. The first full pass-through of the broad tariffs from April 2 |
* Some YoY figures are based on the BLS initial release or on this analysis's interpolated estimates. Source-to-source deviations of ±0.3pp are possible. For Oct 2025 the initial release itself was missing due to the government shutdown.
Through March, PPI gave a two-sided message: "inflation is sticky, but the core is cool." The headline was a 3-year high at +4.0% YoY, yet core MoM came in at +0.1%, a sharp miss versus the market expectation of +0.5%, and with Services MoM at 0.0% the sticky services inflation the Fed worries about most was quiet. In April this all broke down at once.
At the time of the March release there were already warning signs. Processed Intermediate Goods +6.6% YoY (the largest since Nov 2022), Stage 1 Intermediate Demand +6.2% YoY. In other words, intermediate-goods prices upstream of the wholesale stage were already at multi-year highs, and it was only a matter of time before they flowed down to the wholesale stage (Final Demand). April PPI was the result of that pipe finally bursting.
At the 4/29 FOMC, Chair Powell's final meeting, the policy rate was held at 3.50–3.75%. Powell's term ends on 5/15 (he stays on as a governor). Just before the PPI release, the market priced in a 98% chance of a June hold, and a 0% cut / 30% hike in December. With the April PPI +6.0% shock added on top, BofA's scenario of "no cuts until H2 2027" may harden into consensus. We are entering territory where a 0.25pp hike at some point in 2026 becomes theoretically possible.
The US 10Y Treasury yield was at 4.46% as of 5/12, a 1-year high. If the April PPI shock combines with the disappearance of cut expectations, a break of 4.50–4.70% is possible. The 2Y could rise in sympathy, repricing short-rate risk as well. The 30Y mortgage stays entrenched above 7% for the long haul. As for corporate-bond spreads, IG stays stable while HY could widen. The proposition that "bonds are a safe asset" gets challenged once again.
The "a cut is coming soon" narrative that justified high P/E ratios is effectively over. Even so, despite the PPI shock, yesterday (5/12) NVDA, MU and TSLA held up with isolated strength. That is, a setup is forming in which (i) names with strong pricing power like AI and semiconductors + (ii) inflation hedges (energy, utilities, consumer staples) + (iii) value stocks (banks with improving NIM) show relative strength, while discretionary and high-P/E growth stocks come under pressure. The -10/-5/-12% plunges in INTC/AMD/QCOM yesterday were the first step in showing how that multiple pressure works.
The simple model "Fed cuts delayed → dollar strength" holds. Upward pressure on the DXY. That said, if PPI 6% YoY persists for the long term, the dollar's real value erodes → long-term downward pressure also accumulates. The consistent view is short-term (3–6 months) dollar strength prevailing + long-term (2027~) gradual weakness. In between, expect pressure for the won/dollar to break above 1,500 plus the possibility of the yen/dollar breaking above 160.
(a) Foreign investors have sold Korean stocks for 5 consecutive sessions, a cumulative -14.5 trillion won this month — the PPI shock could add further selling pressure. (b) If the FX rate breaks above 1,500 won, wariness rises that Korea's FX authorities (the Bank of Korea) might intervene, and KOSPI volatility expands. (c) Yet SK Hynix surged +7.68% in isolation yesterday, once again proving the HBM decoupling thesis — even with hot PPI, Korean semiconductors with pricing power directly track the US NVDA/MU flow. The split between macro weakness vs. micro strength operates most acutely in the Korean market.
The first data point to confirm whether April PPI +6.0% YoY flows into CPI with a 1–2 month lag. If the May CPI headline exceeds +4.0% YoY, the no-cuts-until-H2-2027 scenario is all but locked in. Consensus is currently expected around +4.0%. A hot CPI could push the 10Y above 4.7%.
The selection of a new chair (inauguration scheduled 7/1) plus changes to the June FOMC dot plot will be decisive. If the dot-plot median for 2026 falls to zero cuts (the current dot plot shows 1–2), market prices reprice once more. If the dot plot even signals a hike, expect a short-term shock.
If peace negotiations with Iran progress, oil prices fall → relief on the PPI headline. If they collapse, renewed tension in the Strait of Hormuz adds another shock. At the same time, Trump's visit to China (5/13~15) + Jensen Huang accompanying him → H200 negotiations work as a side effect. All three could be decided at once between 5/15 and 5/17.
If May PPI (release scheduled 6/12) and June PPI (scheduled 7/15) hold in the high-5% range, Scenario B is confirmed. If even one of them drops to +5% or below, the possibility of Scenario A revives.
If unemployment starts to exceed 4.5%, the probability of Scenario C (stagflation) rises. The key is whether wage growth and hourly earnings rise in tandem with PPI.
The PPI shock is a US macro event, but it flows into the Korean market through four channels. It is the external variable that determines the next stage of the dynamic move in which the KOSPI hit an all-time high of 7,844 yesterday (5/13).
One should not overhaul an entire macro scenario over a single hot PPI print, but April PPI +6.0% YoY is the result of four signals firing at once that make it hard to dismiss as one-off noise — (i) the first full pass-through right after the 4/2 tariffs took effect, (ii) a simultaneous jump in Goods and Services, (iii) the pipeline inflation that was already signaling in March with Stage 1 intermediate-goods prices at +6.2% YoY, and (iv) an estimation error that sharply beat the +4.9% consensus by 1.1pp.
Unless all four of these break down at the same time, it is reasonable to take as a baseline the hypothesis that "the disinflation trend of 2025 reversed into a new regime in 2026 driven by tariffs and the Iran conflict." That is why Scenario B is closest to the weighted average.
The May CPI (6/11), the June FOMC (6/17~18), and the trajectory of the Iran conflict — these three are the key inflection points that will split Scenarios A/B/C within the next 30 days, and for Korean investors a two-pronged positioning that hedges macro weakness while not missing micro strength (HBM, AI infrastructure, power) fits May–July KOSPI volatility best.